This paper traces the formal and informal allocation of vehicles by the Soviet administrative-command economy in the early and mid 1930s using the very same documents as did the Soviet dictator some 70 years earlier. Vehicles should present Soviet resource allocation in its most favorable light, since their production and allocation was highly centralized and tightly monitored. This case study, however, shows the complicated reality of vehicle allocation.
INTRODUCTION
The Soviet command economy, which emerged in late 1920s as Stalin's team took control and existed in basically unchanged form until its breakdown in 1991, represents an extreme case of governmental control of the economy. It was characterized by the administrative planning of production and distribution, state ownership of the means of production, and the control of economic decision making by a dictatorship. The Soviet command system spread to Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba. How it worked, therefore, may yield instructive lessons for economies that combine some of its features, such as political dictatorship, state ownership, and/or administrative planning. The Soviet system created, at its peak, the world's second largest military power and produced relatively high rates of growth from the late 1920s to the mid 1960s, but these achievements were accompanied by excess mortality, declining real consumption, industrial development heavily skewed toward military production, and the use of penal labor, costs the dictator accepted to secure the regime against internal and external threats. These apparent sacrifices of economic rationality have been widely discussed in the literature. 1 This paper contrasts the theory and reality of the Soviet administrative-command system by using the recently-opened records of the Soviet state and party archives. In theory, all capital and natural resources were claimed (owned) by the state in order to ensure the economy caters to the interests of the dictator. In theory, a central planning apparatus, for the first time in economic history, replaced the market to command the allocation of major commodities. In theory, the dictator exerted control of the resource allocation process by issuing orders to subordinates which were universally obeyed. This "scientific planning" stereotype pictured a highly centralized allocation process in which planners, following the party's instructions, planned outputs and used "scientific" norms to construct a consistent distribution plan for key industrial commodities from input requests of non-opportunistic ministries and regional administrations, who distributed them according to economic criteria among their subordinate organizations. 2 The Western literature has attempted to examine the validity of these stereotypes:
Scholars have pointed out that Soviet "scientific" planning was "non-scientific". Plans were rarely realized and frequently amended.
3 Enterprise managers evaded plans and overdemanded resources. 4 Rather than being an economy of "balances", the Soviet economy was a "shortage economy" due to over-optimistic ("taut") target-setting, 5 the state's inability to impose hard budget constraints on its enterprises, 6 planning errors, 7 and perhaps even deliberate creation of opportunities for corruption. 8 An exhaustive empirical study by Zaleski showed that the rate of 2 Gosplan SSSR, Metodicheskie ukazanii k rasrabotke gosudarstvennykh planov ekonomicheskogo I or quasi-market forces at relatively high levels remains to be studied. 13 Hayek and Mises questioned the feasibility of a single decision maker replacing the market already in the 1920s and 1930s. 14 What we do not know is the extent to which high-level planning, ministerial, and territorial officials used market-like allocations in wholesale and capital markets.
Third, the planning stereotype says virtually nothing about how the Soviet system redistributed existing stocks of assets. Economies must have ways of redistributing capital assets from lower to higher uses to adjust for changing conditions; so we must assume that the Soviet economy had some practical procedure in place.
Fourth and most generally, we lack a picture of how and how well resource management was carried out and its relationship to planning. Why did adjustments and interventions take place after the plan was completed? Were they themselves chaotic or welfare improving?
The excessive secrecy surrounding the Soviet system prevented Western researchers from dealing with these four issues. Gregory showed that we knew little about the practical operation of the Soviet economy above the level of the enterprise -about how planning (or Zaleski's resource management) actually functioned. 15 The opening of the formerly-secret State and Party now use the same documents that the dictator, the planner, and the industrial minister themselves used to make their decisions and operate their organizations.
We could tackle the four enumerated issues either generally or through case studies.
Given the enormous complexity of the Soviet economy, we conclude that the case-study approach provides the best starting point. This paper traces the allocation of a single capital asset -vehicles, one of the most "deficit" of commodities -in the 1930s, using the operational plans and routine documentation, which have fallen below the radar screen of past studies based on published plans. We exclude production of vehicles from our study. Shocks to production are exogenous in our analysis.
Vehicle distribution should present Soviet resource allocation in its most favorable light with respect to the Mises-Hayek information problem critique: In this period, a maximum of 160,000 vehicles were distributed per year; production was highly concentrated and fairly homogeneous; it should have been easy to keep track of stocks of cars and trucks; and their allocation was directed by a three-person committee of the top political/economic leadership.
The Soviet State and Party Archives provide researchers with a unique opportunity to place themselves in the shoes of the Soviet dictator. We can reconstruct the allocation of vehicles using the very same documents (including penciled margin comments), petitions, and investigative reports as the dictator's own allocators.
A vehicle is a long-lived asset that provide services over a period of years. The services of vehicles can be allocated by distributing new production and/or redistributing existing stocks from one economic agent to another. Given that new production was large relative to the existing stock and the depreciation rate was high in the Soviet Union of 1930s, the allocation of new production had more of an effect than redistribution. Nevertheless, we focus on two basic allocation problems: First, given production and imports, how were vehicles allocated among the virtually unlimited number of potential claimants? Second, given the current allocation of existing stock, how were vehicles reallocated from one user to another. Thus, we examine the institutions that the Soviet dictatorship put in place to direct the initial and secondary allocations of capital assets. If the distribution system consisted of one omniscient planner, then these answers would reduce to solving a simple algebra problem. This case study shows that the institutional framework and procedures of vehicle allocation were far more complicated. A number of players participated in the game: the dictator, the dictator's loyal agents, wholesale/intermediate organizations, the producer, and the final users. Each played the game differently.
Preview of Findings
Our case study uncovers a number of unexpected findings for those schooled on the existing literature: First, we find that planners, the agents most stressed in the literature, were limited to the relatively-unimportant technical role of intermediary between consumers, expressing their demands in requests, and the dictator who had the ultimate decision-making power. Second, we find that, although formally most vehicles were allocated by centralized quarterly plans, the dictator did not commit to the plans it approved, especially during periods of shocks. Regular planning was disrupted and often overridden by ad hoc decrees. The dictator's appropriation of unlimited discretionary power was the ultimate source of Zaleski's "resource management." Third, the producer also could influence the primary allocation at the margin in a previously-unobserved planning "aftermarket," although the dictator should have been able easily to monitor and control the producer. Fourth, the system of planning/resource management was supplemented by redistributions of control rights of existing stocks, or "mobilizations", which were frequently disobeyed or ordered at lower levels. Fifth, although some "retail" markets were permitted, the extent of illegal or semi-legal secondary markets was incomparably larger, because multitudes of consumers were denied access to official channels of distribution. Disfranchised consumers even resorted to home assembly from spare parts or decommissioned vehicles -practices that were especially annoying to the dictator, who sought absolute control over such valuable assets. Most generally, we find that, although the dictator claimed all output and existing stock of vehicles, it lacked the capacity to monitor distribution to enforce its claims. Monitoring capacity was low because the dictator, unwilling to share decision-making power, paradoxically had to rely on opportunistic industrial and regional leaders. The actual distribution system constituted a complicated "machine" where each wheel, bolt and nut was self-interested and used its political power and/or information advantages to secure undivided control over available resources.
OFFICIAL WHOLESALE DISTRIBUTION OF NEW PRODUCTION
Soviet industry began its own mass vehicle manufacturing program in the early 1930s to end reliance on imports. Less than 10,000 vehicles were distributed per quarter in 1932, when a new factory in Nizhny Novgorod (Gorky) started to produce Ford models 'A' (car) and 'AA'
(1.5-ton truck). 17 By the mid 1930s, production increased to approximately 40,000 per quarter.
The Soviet State and Party Archives provide a few quarterly distribution plans along with voluminous files of requests for vehicles and related correspondence. Investigations of abuse and malfeasance provide the most valuable information on the informal workings of quasimarket institutions. The annual and five-year vehicle plans were found to have little operational significance and are not analyzed here.
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The following players participated in the official distribution process:
Dictator refers to the supreme leadership of the Soviet Union: the highest party body, Politburo, and the government proper, the Council of Peoples' Commissariats, Sovnarkom, that formed together an interlocking directorate. The Politburo was comprised of ten to twelve leading party officials, with Stalin as the General Secretary. The Politburo, in its formal or informal meetings, set priorities, which could be either general, such as the number of cars to be produced in the first quarter, or very specific, such as allotting two cars for a military research facility. 19 The Politburo did not usually delve into the details of plan preparation, ceding this 17 Few more models of trucks were produced in two older factories, in Moscow and Yaroslavl.
18 Among all the archival materials on the Second five-year plan (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) , there is only one very rough vehicle distribution plan by end users, which shows beginning stocks and proposed ending stocks, the latter being based not upon summaries of orders but upon general perspectives. This plan had no operational significance: produced only in 1934, it was never mentioned in later planning documents. For some years of the period (but not for all) annual plans were developed but quarterly plans seldom refer to them as well.
authority to the government. Formally, the government, Supplier consisted of the main administration for tractor and automobile industry and the automobile supply trust, both of the Ministry of Heavy Industry. Production and sales were thus formally separated, although both "halves" cooperated closely. The Supplier prepared monthly delivery plans, which adjusted quarterly distribution plans to actual production, and issued the all-important authorizations to buy vehicles. On at least two occasions in the 1930s, the Supplier was authorized to prepare its own independent vehicle distribution plans but this was 24 GARF 5446.14a.628.143-4. Note that 40,000 vehicles were planned to be produced for that quarter, meaning that initially the Ministry of Heavy Industry claimed all vehicles for itself! 25 Such input-norm calculations were based on simple technological coefficients and did not take costs into consideration. A typical petition would essentially read: "We need to move X tons of gravel per day;
one truck can transport Y; hence we need X/Y trucks." not a common practice. The Supplier played an important role in the planning aftermarket through its control of actual scheduling and deliveries as will be discussed below.
Consumers of vehicles included virtually all institutions, from those servicing the Dictator directly (the central garage of Sovnarkhom), to ministries, to single enterprises and, in rare cases, individuals. Consumers directed their orders to all of the above-mentioned bodies, but most Consumers placed orders with their superiors hoping to become a part of the superior's request. The successful applicant had to pay for the vehicle out of its own investment budget -a technicality that could not stop superiors from "intercepting" vehicles for own use or redirecting them to others. Consumers could lose authorization to buy vehicles if they lacked funds.
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However, it was not the lack of funds that was usually binding but the limited supply of vehicles. In 1933, a major public transportation company (SoiuzTrans) was able to spend only half of its vehicle budget, even though the budget had been calculated on the erroneous assumption of falling vehicle prices. A large number of Consumers were disenfranchised by administrative measures and had to seek vehicles outside the formal system. A few disenfranchised themselves through "moral restraint." 27 Private demand for vehicles was limited to about one percent. Organizations of lesser importance "unbound" to wholesale consumers or who lacked "connections" stood little chance of registering their demand.
Consumers clearly understood that the number of vehicles demanded far exceeded those available for distribution. This inherent "shortage" led Consumers to resort to the type of nonprice signaling hypothesized by Powell to increase the probability of getting vehicles. 28 The Consumers' messaging "menu" was comprised of complaints and threats of plan failure. ), but a modest request, if fulfilled, meant that the Consumer could not blame plan failure on the lack of vehicles, and transportation problems were among the most popular excuses for plan failure. Thus Consumers faced a tradeoff between quantity and certainty, insofar as smaller than optimal requests were likely to be fulfilled, while large requests risked full rejection.
The vehicle archives reveal the surprising fact that the Dictator and the Planner were never 28 Powell, "Plan Execution and the Workability of Soviet Planning" 29 GARF 5446.14.2029.46; GARF 5446.14a.628.132. 30 GARF 5446.2029v.167. clear which organizations actually received vehicles because distribution plans were highly aggregated and monitoring was sporadic. Neither could the Planner check the credibility of threats of plan failure or determine whether consumers were asking for the "correct" number of trucks. The Dictator, in an attempt to ensure its decision-making prerogative, restricted the circle of those involved in allocation, and consequently limited its own capacity to collect and process information. Confronted with the Consumers' confusing signals, decision-makers (including Molotov himself) would periodically make site visits to gather direct information, for which they were later obliged to "pay" through the formation of patron-client relationships. The next vehicle order would read: "When you were with us you promised…" Once connected,
Consumers produced new orders which had better chances of success, volunteered more information, including denunciations of others. 31 The Dictator's attempts to make up for information deficits with such expeditions could hardly have improved economic efficiency;
instead they caused closed clientele networks to form, where economic assets were exchanged for loyalty.
The aim of Soviet material balance planning was to balance demands with available supplies. The information distortions described above reveal that balanced plans could have been achieved only by chance. Early Soviet planning doctrine envisaged "certain miscalculations" that would require "corrections." 32 However, the very notion of "planning error" is hard to define when shortage makes plans inherently unbalanced, and the Dictator's 31 The director of a public library in Leningrad in 'exchange' for receiving a car shared his new knowledge of the black market for gasoline with his patron in the government, the Peoples Commissar of Inspection, and Politburo member Ian Rudzutak. (GARF 5446.14.2029d.391-392) .
32 Strumilin, Na Planovom Fronte 1920 unlimited power prevents commitment to plans. (1932 and late 1937) ; the remaining three fall in periods of "normal" production. 38 The "satisfaction rate" -the ratio of allocated to requested vehiclesprovides a rough measure of "shortage" in each period. Actual satisfaction rates rose from 15 percent in 1932 to a remarkable 88 percent in early 1937 before falling back to 47 percent during the supply shock of the fourth quarter of 1937. Thus, the early Soviet system began with an enormous "excess demand" for vehicles but was able to satisfy a remarkable nine out of ten consumers by early 1937. Table 1 with an output less half that expected, chose to preserve the allocations of few "preferred customers," while fulfilling only 1 to 2 percent of the orders of lower priority organizations. The imposition of the Dictator's "sticky preferences" led to an extremely uneven (coefficient of variation reached 83.5 percent) and disproportionate (correlation with requests falls to about 0.5) distribution. The Dictator's reaction to the relatively small supply shock of the fourth quarter of 1937 -a 22 percent drop relative to the second quarter -fits the same pattern of adaptation (we lack Gosplan's plans for purposes of comparison). During the "normal" periods of the 3 rd and 4 th quarters of 1934, the Dictator had no incentive to change the Planner's proposal significantly; hence, there was little difference in satisfaction rates and their variation.
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In the "normal" second quarter of 1937, when vehicle production reached four times the 1934 rate, there was an extraordinarily high correlation between requests and the final plan, and the Dictator also supported an almost uniform satisfaction rate.
39 Note that the drop in correlation between the 3 rd and 4 th quarters of 1934 was due to organizational changes. Starting with the 4 th quarter, a growing share of trucks for agriculture was distributed not through the Ministry of Agriculture but through sales to collective farms. Also the Ministry of Supply was split into two agencies. Although Table 1 demonstrates a profound difference between the Dictator's and the Planner's reactions to negative supply shocks, this difference could be ascribed, at least in part, to the lag between the preparation of drafts by the Planner and the Dictator's final decision based upon a lower expectation of output. Only the first quarter of 1932 yields a 'clean natural experiment' in which the Planner's revised plan and the Dictator's final plan respond to the same supply shock (Table 2) . Table 2 starts with Gosplan's first "optimistic" draft plan (expected production of 500 cars) compiled before the beginning of the quarter. Its "pessimistic" second draft (column 2) came two weeks into the quarter. A copy of the Planner's second draft contains penciled remarks that almost coincide with the Dictator's final plan. Thus, the Dictator's version of the "pessimistic plan" (column 3) directly overrides Planner's proposal (column 2) and demonstrates the Dictator's differential approach. As in Table 1 , the Dictator prefers milder cuts than Gosplan for the highest ranking central ministers at the expense of less important Consumers. The fourth column reflects the recovery of production expectations that resulted in the Dictator's intervention some time in the middle of the quarter. 40 Although this distribution is more even than the preceding one, more than half of the unanticipated increase in production was captured by three consumers, the large-scale industry ministry, 41 Moscow, and Leningrad, who must have known to attend the session of the Molotov Commission.
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Why did the Planner opt for more equality and less reshuffling than the Dictator? Soviet planning doctrine assumed an iterative approximation to an "optimal" plan through interchange of information routed top-down (Gosplan's directives to ministries and further down to enterprises) and bottom-up (submission of draft plans by the agents in response). The Planner particularly feared that too large an initial supply/demand gap would result in too slow convergence. Secondly, Gosplan could have pursued an equity strategy of relatively uniform cuts on the assumption that enterprises had equal opportunities to "mobilize hidden reserves", or, in case of brutal necessity, obtain plan corrections from the Dictator. However, Gosplan's institutional interest was probably more important. Significant imbalances placed Gosplan in the middle of serious conflicts as unsatisfied customers barraged the Dictator with complaints.
During the Great Terror of 1936-1938, Gosplan was accused of "wrecking" the quarterly distribution of gasoline but was never accused of "wrecking" the five-year plan. The Dictator, on the other hand, lacked an interest in equality, and viewed administrative "resource mobility" as a prime advantage allowing rapid adjustment of distributional policy. Clearly, the Dictator's preferences dominated because of its power to render ad hoc decrees and to order resource mobilizations.
The fact that almost 90 percent of requests were satisfied in the second quarter of 1937 (Table 1) is a remarkable statistic. Vehicle production grew from four thousand per quarter in 40 The last column is discussed later, in a subsection entitled "Planning aftermarket."
41 Large-scale industry refers to enterprises of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). 42 GARF 5446.14.20295.25 early 1932 to 40,000 per quarter in mid-1937. Production increases, while of undisputed importance, do not alone explain these high satisfaction rates. Vehicles were among the most prized of commodities; investment budgets typically included ample funds; and production increases had been widely publicized. Given the virtually unlimited nominal demand, these factors could have led to inflation of requests in excess of production growth rate. Therefore, we must look beyond increased production to explain the high satisfaction rate. Table 3 shows the correspondence between four quarterly plans (3 rd quarter of 1933 to the 3 rd quarter of 1934 -all from "normal" period ) drawn up by the Supplier, the Planner, and by the Dictator. Each had a different agenda. However, correlation coefficients for both sets of plans (relative to the Dictator) are typically above 95 percent, signifying that a basic distributional consensus was reached by late 1933; disagreement was only at the margin. Once this basic allocation had been set, it made no sense to make "outrageous" claims for vehicles, such as Gosplan felt was being done in early 1933. The tendency to make only marginal changes in plans is termed "planning from the achieved level." Table 1 and 3 together show that, during "good" years, when the economy settled near a stationary state, planning was done from the achieved level, while during supply shocks, planning from the achieved level had to be replaced by brutal Politburo interventions. This conclusion suggests an institutional role for the Dictator.
A system devoid of a market adjustment mechanism cannot handle coordination without an intervening authority. A Planner relying exclusively on consumers' signaling would be without meaningful information in periods of increasing uncertainty. Therefore, the absence of a market makes the Soviet dictator, unlike a simple predatory ruler, an indispensable element of the economic system.
UNOFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION
Most stories of Soviet allocation planning would end with Tables 1 and 2 . They reveal the Dictator's participation in resource allocation beyond general target-setting and demonstrate complimentarily rather than identity of the institutional roles of the Dictator and the Planner.
The formal picture of the Soviet economy as a centrally planned economy, where top-down command flow is decisive, is unchanged. The Soviet state and Party Archives, however, allow us to look below the formal level at informal activities Earlier studies of Soviet managers revealed a vast area of informal discretion at the enterprise level, including some trade in rationed commodities. 43 The relatively simple Soviet economic hierarchy of the 1930s, comprised of less than a dozen economic ministries and headed by a few top political leaders, would seem to rule out informal allocation of a tightly-controlled investment good such as vehicles. The distribution of vehicles provides a window on the boundaries of quasi-markets for highly centralized products. Although most "unplanned" allocations of vehicles would be deliberately hidden from public view, the state and party archives provide an opportunity to study high-level unplanned allocation using information from inspections, investigations, 43 
Granick, Management of Industrial Firms in the USSR; Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR.
complaints, and pure serendipity.
Planning Aftermarket
The "final" plan was approved at a high level of aggregation by branch and by region and was turned over to the Supplier to prepare the actual delivery plans for concrete customers. The Supplier, as the sole producer of vehicles, was in charge of the actual scheduling of deliveries and could refuse to deliver if none were available. The Supplier's exclusive information on vehicles available for delivery and the ephemeral character of rationing certificates (valid only for the quarter of issue), gave it a number of devices to influence the final outcome. First, the Supplier could influence its own allotment by claiming above-plan output. 44 Second, the Supplier could allocate vehicles unclaimed by designated customers, such as those with rationing certificates but unable to pay on time. 45 Third, the Supplier could be temporarily without delivery instructions due to the uneven scheduling of the Dictator's decisions. Even with their high "deficiency," the number of vehicles ready to ship at times exceeded the number of authorizations. 46 The Supplier's control over the order of deliveries gave it partial control except when higher authorities scheduled deliveries themselves by a note from Molotov's secretary or an official decree.
The last column of Table 2 provides a rare quantitative glimpse of the "planning aftermarket," namely, of the Supplier's latitude after the "final" plan was approved. Since the actual production of 242 cars was less than the targets of the final plan, the Supplier had to distribute the shortfall among Consumers. Its choice was to take care of itself (industry) and Consumers with strong connections to the Dictator (army, police, and CART), while cutting drastically less important Consumers, such as territorial authorities and miscellaneous Consumers.
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The Supplier was less successful in getting more vehicles for itself through the formal planning process. As was noted above, the Supplier was allowed to prepare its own draft Table 4 shows that, with the exception of the third quarter of 1933 (first column), the Dictator clearly favored the Planner's plans over those of the Supplier. 49 As the Supplier's plans became more asked for instruction on how to proceed (GARF 5446.14.2029g.82) . 47 The Ministry of Heavy Industry (NKTP) records did not survive intact. Therefore, we have no microdata on the Supplier's discretionary allocation decisions. One reference in archival records makes it clear, though, that the Ministry did maintain its own reserve fund, which was used to serve both its own enterprises and outsiders such as a provincial newspaper (GARF 5446.14.2029d).
48 The Supplier's claim was for its ministry, the Ministry of Heavy Industry. 49 This exceptional plan was actually signed by Supplier's patron, the Minister of Heavy Industry and a member of the Politburo, Ordzhonikidze. Although Ordzhonikidze was increasingly advocating special interests of his ministry, he continued to represent national interests in this period (Khlevniuk, unbalanced in its own favor, the practice of producer planning was canceled. There was only one additional period, 1938, when the Supplier was allowed to draft a distribution plan. We have no data on this plan, but we assume that the results were the same, and the practice was canceled again. The Supplier's de facto control rights over its output were narrowly limited, since the high concentration of vehicle production allowed the Dictator to monitor delivery with sufficient care to prevent highly arbitrary behavior. However, that Supplier had some distributive power, even for a commodity so valued by the Dictator, suggests that producers in less concentrated and less "important" branches of industry could exert significant influence over resource allocation.
Redistribution
Mobilizations and other forms of transfers by administrative order represented the only legal method of redistributing of existing stocks. Even when redistributions occurred through legal sale, permission from CART or even Molotov's Commission might still be needed.
Mobilization would be required by such a system because only the government "owned" capital Kvashonkin, Koshelova and Rogovaia, . Thus, Supplier's plan for the third quarter of 1933 was a surrogate for the Dictator's own plan. assets and assigned control rights to put the assets to their best possible use. The current user's property rights "should have been transitory, depending on the whims of the true owner.
Archival records, however, provide evidence that questions the official picture of strict state control of redistributions. Second, a large number of vehicle mobilizations were ordered by uncoordinated local state and party administrators. Despite the Planner's warnings against "anarchic" local mobilizations, 50 GARF 5446.14.2029d.403.
the Dictator neither prohibited local mobilizations nor regulated them, saying: "We consider it useless at this time." 51 By refusing to intervene, the Dictator appeared weak to his agents, because chaotic local mobilizations had the side effect of ruining the defense ministry's mobilization plan of vehicles to be sequestered in case of emergency.
Third, many of the Dictator's mobilization decisions were initiated bottom-up, involving the Dictator as arbitrator in struggles among agent. In July 1933, an oil trust (Azneft of the Ministry of Heavy Industry) asked Molotov to give it 21 "Oil Export" (NefteExport of the Ministry of Foreign Trade) trucks held in customs in Baku for the "obvious" reason that the current owner no longer needed them for its defunct venture in Iran. The foreign trade ministry argued that it had bought the trucks with its own money earned in its operations in Iran, and was planning to relocate them to a new venture in Mongolia. The "arbiter" Molotov made a "fair" decision to give 10 of the trucks to Azneft, leaving 11 with the disgruntled trade ministry.
The trade ministry continued to protest, but there is no evidence that Molotov's decision was SoiuzTrans and two with Intourist, while giving seven new buses to Odessa from Ukraine's upcoming quota. Thus, the rivals get their satisfaction at the expense of a third party; Molotov's 51 GARF 5446.14.2054. 52 GARF 5446.14.2029g.132,140-3. decision overrode Ukraine's own quarterly distribution plan for buses.
53
Finally, the archives reveal cases of organizations rejecting vehicles allocated by Dictator.
In 1933, a trust of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was assigned 20 trucks to deliver supplies to remote areas near the Chinese border. The Minister of Trade refused, arguing that the trust was not up to the task and even offered to give up 40 trucks if another organization took over the task. The trade ministry finally accepted the trucks when threatened with prosecution for "sabotage." 54 Apparently, this transfer initiated by the Dictator was a mixed blessing for the beneficiary since it assigned an obligation to produce more output.
Such anecdotal evidence of conflicts over redistributions shows that Consumers -the Dictator's agents -were pursuing their narrow interests. The Dictator had little information to judge which agent could use vehicles more efficiently. The Dictator had no reason to disregard any of the claims of its "loyal" agents, and disloyal agents were not supposed to occupy managerial positions. Under normal circumstances, the Dictator had no grounds to prefer one over the other. The unverifiable signals of the disputing parties, as in the Baku and Odessa cases, prompted qualified solutions such as "give some satisfaction to both sides." The lack of good signals may explain why the Dictator gave the right "to take" but not the obligation "to
give", to split the disputed stock "fairly", its lack of commitment to enforce transfer decisions, or to stop unsanctioned local mobilizations. Such behavior placed the Dictator in a sort of "loyalty trap," awarding its agents with more effective control rights than intended.
Interceptions
Ministries and regional organizations and their representative offices in Moscow managed 53 GARF 5446.14.2029g.109-13. 54 GARF 5446.14.2033.
the physical delivery of vehicles from the plants to regional distribution sites where they were to be picked up by buyers. This practice gave intermediary ministerial and regional authorities the opportunity either to "intercept" vehicles for their own use or to redirect them to other users.
The archives reveal remarkably little checking of actual vehicle distributions. Only regional distributions to agricultural ministries were regularly monitored. In many cases, the Planner and the Dictator did not even know the disaggregated distribution, given the refusal of corporate customers to submit enterprise-level plans. 55 To prevent interceptions of vehicles the Planner and the Dictator regulated part of the second-level distribution by special instructions. In 1933, special instructions prescribed final destinations for 8 percent of trucks below the ministry or regional level (by city, trust, or even by enterprise). Detailed distributions of cars, the most valuable commodity of all, were often made at the highest levels of government at least until 1938.
The archives provide ample anecdotal evidence that intercepted vehicles were used by the superior either for own use or for leasing. Investigations carried out, again by the Worker and Peasant Inspection in Moscow in late 1932 showed that at least 18 of 113 sampled organizations were using vehicles destined for to enterprises outside of Moscow "for purposes unrelated to their main duties," namely to earn cash. In some cases, such "misuse" resulted from mutual agreement between the intermediary and designated end user, especially when a relatively weak representative office was the interceptor of a vehicle intended for more powerful patrons.
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Interception and redirection introduce significant gaming elements into the formal planning 55 Belova and Gregory, "Dictator, loyal, and opportunistic agents: The Soviet archives on creating the soviet economic system." [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] process. Wholesale Consumers might forward orders that stood a better chance of fulfillment, knowing that they could be used in other ways during the actual distribution phase. Interceptions and mobilizations show the extent of agents' effective control rights. The
Dictator's ownership claims exceeded its monitoring capacity; de facto "ownership" rights had to be delegated downward, while reserving unlimited discretion above. The net result was a "nested dictatorship". Each agent behaved toward its subordinates as the Dictator behaved towards its subordinates. Local "dictators" were constrained in their actions primarily by the interests of other agents (SoiuzTrans vs. Intourist), while the Dictator was constrained only by the claims made by other governments, while the Dictator faced opportunistic behavior from ministries and regional authorities, ministries and regional authorities faced opportunistic behavior by enterprises and local authorities.
57 GARF 5446.14.2029b.350.
RETAIL MARKETS
With the exception of reserve fund allotments, which went directly to end users, Soviet vehicle allocation was nominally a "wholesale" system, with planned allocations to large wholesale who were supposed to distribute to end users according to plan. Direct sales to individuals were limited to one percent, reserved primarily for luminaries and dignitaries.
Berliner's and Granick's studies of Soviet management revealed an active inter-enterprise market in producer goods and raw materials; therefore, it would come as no great surprise to find an active retail market in vehicles, despite their strictly controlled nature. We already noted above an active rental market operated by wholesale consumers, largely in the Moscow area.
Three retail markets for vehicles were tolerated and even promoted in the 1930s.
Currency, Futures, and Reserve Funds
Torgsin, originally a specialized trade network for servicing foreigners, was opened to Abuse of vehicle sales by Torgsin was sufficient to spark independent investigations, which uncovered sales of vehicles at low prices for domestic currency to politically connected persons, such as the secret police (OGPU), and even to shady speculators. 61 Even tightly-controlled Torgsin, which was almost a direct representative of the Dictator, opportunistically abused the intent to raise currency for state needs.
With the closing of Torgsin in 1936, another form of commercial vehicle trade was instituted; namely, the retail sales of trucks to collective farms to encourage "successful" Administration for Resort Construction whose officials appeared to be OGPU servicemen. These 12 vehicles were paid with "currency of various countries and gold scrap including tooth crowns" (probably a by-product of OGPU interrogations). Another 2 were bought by the East Siberian border guard administration, using a Moscow Wool Trust as a legal cover in return for one car. When the Wool Trust kept both cars, it was denounced by cheated border guards, and its director went to jail. Another wool trust bought one car in exchange for a Soviet-built truck; two cars were bought by a housing co-operative of foreign professionals and exchanged for trucks from Aeroflot. The final two cars were bought by a Soviet engineer who negotiated to pay only half of the price in hard currency and by a fictitious foreigner, "Arthur Smith," who was later identified as the swindler Kogan, previously an Intourist employee.
(GARF 5446.14à.628.76-81).
"Auto-obligations" (avtoobiazatelstva) represented the numerically most significant type of "retail" sales. "Auto-obligations" were "futures" for the products of auto works, which the A relatively small but significant number of vehicles were allocated directly to "retail" customers by the Molotov Commission from Sovnarkom's "reserve fund." This reserve fund comprised 1 to 10 percent of planned production in the 1930s, a figure that gradually declined with the growing importance of ad hoc distributions. Unlike other planned quotas, the Molotov Commission itself was not constrained by fixed quotas. Commissioners usually allocated more vehicles from the reserve than it contained, but on occasion they gave less even though the queue of requests was never empty. Allocations from the reserve fund allow us to see Dictator's own preferences uninfluenced by intermediate planning bodies, such as Gosplan. We have prepared a separate analysis of the reserve fund, and we shall not dwell on this issue here. 64 Our analysis shows that the reserve fund was used primarily for political rather than economic goals.
Unofficial Secondary Markets
The Dictator established strict rules to limit private sales of vehicles. Organizations could not sell vehicles at prices exceeding the original price minus depreciation; they could not sell to individuals before the vehicle's complete depreciation if it could be sold to an organization; and permission of the trade ministry was required to sell imported vehicles. Clearly the first prohibition was hardly acceptable to prospective sellers in view of the considerable inflation, the second was easily evaded, and the third was made obsolete by the disappearance of the ministry of trade. (We did not find the evidence that this instruction was subsequently revised revealed what was then regarded as a surprising degree of discretionary managerial authority, especially with respect to supply. 69 The Soviet manager's protagonist (principal) was the industrial ministry, which handed down the government's tasks and allotted "funded" resources to the industrial manager "agent." Our study of vehicle allocation focuses on the highest-level interactions between the Dictator, as represented by the Molotov Commission, and "wholesale" users as represented by industrial ministries and regional governmental authorities. That these industrial ministers and regional leaders constituted the top leadership of the Soviet Union suggests that all parties should have shared a stake in the "national interest." In theory, vehicles should have been easy to centralize: relatively few; only three models; and distribution directly by the Dictator. These facts alone would appear to severely limit principal/agent problems with 68 respect to vehicle distribution.
The reality of vehicle distribution was quite different. The highest "corporate" users had widespread "unplanned" discretion, gained through superior local information and the center's unwillingness to interfere and challenge. Major industrial consumers used this discretion opportunistically to increase their share of output, to understate current stocks, to use vehicles that had been allotted to their subordinates, to sell vehicles to individuals, and even to disobey mobilization decrees. Gosplan, the Planner, never planned actual wholesale transactions, even Necessary and sufficient conditions were in place for the existence of informal secondary markets despite the threat of repression: The presence of a large number of consumers, with cash and barter resources and excluded from the formal process, provided fertile soil for secondary markets, home assembly, fraud, and illegal rental operations. The Dictator's claims to "ownership" of all capital assets were disproportionate relative to its capability to monitor and enforce its claims. Therefore, the Dictator had to cede effective control rights and the rents that accrued therefrom to its agents.
The system's highest industrial and regional authorities treated their agents, the industrial enterprises and trusts, in the same way they were treated by their principal, the Molotov Commission. The economic system thus constituted a nested dictatorship, which tended to reproduce itself, even in terms of organizational structure at every hierarchical level. 70 Industrial ministries, regional organizations, local party organizations, or any other agent entrusted by its superior with some resource-allocation power, engaged in arbitrary "resource maneuvering" through mobilizations, interceptions, and rule-breaking, copying the behavior of its superior, who could not prevent such activity due to inferior information and/or the need for loyalty.
Redistribution of centrally-planned capital goods, such as vehicles, either initiated from above or by a predatory rival, created a struggle for control rights. Vehicle users had to fight for new production and to keep existing stocks. The anecdotes of attempted hostile takeovers show that a Soviet "market" for corporate-asset control existed, a fact confirmed by other studies,
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which find hostile takeovers of whole industrial branches by rival ministries. Clearly, economies require a mechanism to redistribute long-lived capital goods; the Soviet system used mobilizations and takeovers to accomplish this end. Our case study of vehicles illustrates the basic property-rights logic of the system: The Dictator chose a highly centralized system to control valuable resources. Only the Dictator was to have property rights. Therefore, every allocation decision was revertible from the implementation of the quarterly plan to the postpurchase transfer of existing cars. Agents, in their struggle for de facto property rights, sought to obtain resources for their sole use, rather than rely upon the services of large centralized justified their permanent need for an "own" car or truck and did not ask for temporary assignments of vehicles. Even faithful agents resisted transfer orders that the Dictator felt were in the larger interest, preferring certain control as giving them a better chance to fulfill the Dictator's plans.
The resulting system of conditional control rights, which was expected to provide the Dictator with comprehensive and transparent instruments for resource management, actually encouraged agents to conceal their actions. The more rigid the restrictions on non-sanctioned transactions, the more agents engaged in them. Thus, it was not only "fatal conceit", the HayekMises notion of impossibility of solving economy-wide problems from a single center, that created complex information problems. The mere existence of an administrative-command hierarchy, which was designed to implement solutions favorable to the Dictator, brought about the behavior of economic agents that was undermining the system of centralized control.
